GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension(bleepingcomputer.com)

738 分 | 作者 Timofeibu 22小时前

54 条评论

  • camkego 6小时前
    The security model, or almost lack of any whatsoever in VSCode drove me to only install MSFT extensions, then use Code Server in a docker container, but I decided I didn’t like using my editor in a browser.

    Finally I have decided to start using Zed, which isn’t perfect on the security front, but much better IMHO. The combination of WASM extensions, and the ability to put language servers, etc, in dev-containers seems like a great step forward.

    I hope Zed continues to improve their extension and language server security model. Actually I hope VSCode does too, but honestly, I am not optimistic.

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    • Balinares 5小时前
      Wait, how do you arrive at the thought that Zed is more secure? The one time I gave it a try, it tried to silently run npm -- yes, THIS[1] npm -- in the background without telling me, and I noped the heck out. Did I miss something?

      [1] https://www.reddit.com/r/programming/comments/1tapmvi/mass_n...

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      • giancarlostoro 5小时前
        Pretty sure any IDE worth anything that has JS support pulls NPM packages at some point to lint code, no? You're not giving me much to be outraged about without more information. Zed tries to set things up for you so you're not wasting hours trying to figure out how to set them up in a brand new editor.
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        • jay_kyburz 5小时前
          No doubt an unpopular opinion, but if I install an app that is going to do things in the background, I'm going to hold that apps developers responsible for any breaches. If Zed needs javascript to do its job, it probably should be downloading it from their own servers, or even better, just ship the editor with all the code it needs to do its job.
  • danpalmer 6小时前
    Why does a company in GitHub's place allow employees to install random VSCode extensions?! That seems grossly irresponsible.
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    • wyclif 6小时前
      You're assuming they allow it, but it might be against policy.
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      • baxtr 5小时前
        I’m pretty sure there is an policy on their internal wiki saying you shouldn’t do that.

        Problem is: most employees don’t care to read these. Although I’m sure something like this could have been checked for during commit.

      • danpalmer 5小时前
        Fair point, I hadn't considered this, but wouldn't they just disallow it?

        Like, I use a VSCode fork at work, but the enforced extensions store backend is based on an allowlist and extensions need reviewing to be available there.

  • cdnsteve 5小时前
    So basically we are now waiting for a wave of massive new exploits coming via GitHub itself. Lovely
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    • brador 5小时前
      The cloud is just someone else’s computer.
  • gizzlon 5小时前
    Interesting, this went Tanstack -> Nx Console -> GitHub

    I wonder how many other secrets and tokens have been stolen, just waiting to be abused to publish a malicious version of.. something.

    IMO, the problem is [1] that actually rotation all secrets just because you might have installed a compromised packe is a huuge PITA. So it's tempting to take it lightly and hope for the best. And even if you really try, it's easy to miss one.

    1: in addition to "running code from whereever" with little sandboxing

  • mcoliver 13小时前
    Vs code extensions have been terrifying for a long time. Such a wild and obvious attack vector. I'm constantly getting pop ups in vscode to install an extension because it recognizes a certain file type. It's 50-50 whether that extension is owned by a company or some random dev. Some of these have millions of installs and on first glance appear to be official company owned extensions. I'm at a point in my life where I only installed official company owned extensions and even that is hard to be sure I'm not getting suckered. Sad state.
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    • Gigachad 12小时前
      The problem extends far beyond VS code. All extensions and executable code has the same problem. There was a case where Disney was hacked because an employee installed a BeamNG mod that had bundled malware.

      A company that wants to remain secure would have to employ strict restrictions on installing software. Only installing npm packages and plugins from an internal preapproved repo for example.

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      • miki123211 11小时前
        Running code isn't the problem. The fact that (almost) all code runs at the same security level is.

        You regularly run tons of untrusted code when visiting websites. That code can't wreak havoc on your machine because it's well-sandboxed. Yet, if we advocate for sandboxing in more places, the "gun nuts of tech" scream about monopolistic practices and taking away user control.

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        • swiftcoder 5小时前
          > Yet, if we advocate for sandboxing in more places

          Sandboxing plugins is pretty much universally desired? You seem to be conflating this with the issue of platform gatekeepers deciding which software is allowed to run on our own hardware

        • atq2119 10小时前
          Fully agree with the first half of your comment. The second half goes off the rails, though.

          I rarely see people complain about sandboxing.

          What people complain about is when devices are locked down in a way where you are only allowed to install software that is approved by a central gatekeeper, even though sandboxing is in place that should make it far safer to run arbitrary safer than on traditional desktop systems.

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          • nstart 9小时前
            Agreed. What's frustrating is that we have models for how sandboxing can work and instead of investing efforts into nailing that experience, the OS providers are prone to turning it into a monetization/lock in layer instead. My VLC and VS Code should have an OS native way of being limited to particular functionality. But when the OS providers implement the sandbox, they center it around an App Store and restrictions on only apps that have been notarized where said notorization costs money or a requires a subscription. And then they remove the ability to do things which their own native apps can do and set tighter controlling rules on what APIs apps can ever have access to.

            When all I wanted was for VLC or similar to run in a sandbox by default where a plug-in I install can't do anything to my system or access the internet by default because the software itself is restricted to just the files I'm using and that's it.

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            • Gigachad 9小时前
              That exists on linux under flatpak, but it requires Wayland and Pipewire. Also many packages just request full system permissions rather than update to work in a sandbox.

              It's in the works and one day we will have it but progress is slow.

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              • skydhash 6小时前
                I really like openbsd's pledge. It's nice when you look at the code and see the program restrict itself to a smaller set of operations. Not everything in ports has adopted it, and the point is moot for closed source. But for the latter, VM and an isolated segment would be the proper solutions.
        • salawat 8小时前
          Never let a crisis go to waste, huh?

          We've had the solution to shit like this, and it's called the SecurityManager in Java. No one wants to configure the damn thing, but it is there. Also, auditing the code you pull in. Yeah. Reading code sucks. Yeah. It's a lotta work. But if you don't check, you don't effing know.

          All y'all want the fun of unprotected sex (rawdogging the ecosystem) and are starting to get burned by the VD's we old-timers have been hollerin' at you telling you will be coming the more you do this promiscuous dependency inclusion.

          But hey. Enjoy it I guess. No skin off my nose.

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          • hnlmorg 5小时前
            > Also, auditing the code you pull in. Yeah. Reading code sucks. Yeah. It's a lotta work. But if you don't check, you don't effing know.

            While I do generally agree with this sentiment, it’s not always possible in the ways you imply:

            - Plenty of systems pull packages that are not human readable. For example WASM plugins. Or it might even by in unfamiliar languages such as a Python package calling C.

            - You might argue that “if you cannot understand the code then don’t use the package” but that isn’t always practical. Security packages will include maths that is beyond the average software engineer. Other performance-critical packages (such as libraries in the ML space) will have highly optimised code that isn’t easy for the average developer to read through.

            - Some supply chain attacks have been targeting popular packages. So now you need to re-read every single point version (!!!) on every update. Heck, even using lock files to the patch version in semver might not save you for some language ecosystems because you can overwrite git tags. So a package version that is safe on your local machine might end up compromised when compiled via CI/CD.

            - And then there’s CI/CD itself. We are seeing supply chain attacks in GitHub Actions plugins. So now you have to pin all of your actions to their SHA instead of semver.

            There definitely needs to be a better security model to support developers because the current status quo makes it very hard to vet everything you run, and very easy to fuck up. In all other fields of IT, we’d say that was a failure of the process rather than a failure of the individual.

      • xyzzy123 6小时前
        Funnily enough a lot of this "extension sprawl" is caused by the _difficulty_ of installing tools on locked down Windows machines. I recently moved to a locked down SoE and instead of being able to use regular tools (which require a lengthy negotiation process to install) I now use extensions for absolutely everything, _because_ they're not currently policed in the same way...
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        • ihateolives 5小时前
          At my last workplace I was not allowed to install JSON viewer/prettier extension for my browser, but I was allowed to install VScode with random JSON plugins.
      • charlieyu1 11小时前
        I don’t understand why we don’t just sandbox everything. We have done it for web browsers, we can definitely do it for VSCode extensions.
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        • inlined 11小时前
          What are you withholding from the sandbox without making it useless?
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          • atq2119 10小时前
            Internet access. An editor extension does not need it.
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            • larusso 7小时前
              Most sandbox systems today, take seatbelt from Apple for instance, only strip permissions. If your extensions without internet access calls a tool that needs it, boom access denied or worse, weird network issues.

              One would need some kind of ring system where less privileged processes can call higher privileged processes with their own sandbox permissions.

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              • therealdrag0 6小时前
                Let the user grant permissions at install time. An error is a success in this scenario.
            • sedatk 10小时前
              All AI agent extensions disagree in unison.
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              • californical 5小时前
                It could request access to a specific domain which you can approve or deny
        • Gigachad 9小时前
          Because it's hard to create a system that is both sandboxed and powerful. You can't have an extension system that allows a plugin to run a locally installed linter or view the status of docker containers but can't execute something malicious.

          I do agree though that it is incredibly important to start taking sandboxing seriously. But there is a lot of difficulty and friction, and most of the users will scream and cry about extensions being limited.

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          • moring 6小时前
            > You can't have an extension system that (...)

            Yes you can. Extension systems of today have multiple problems that prevent that. The basic assumption that has to go, though, is that a core application like VSCode can be written once, then be extended to infinity without the core evolving. That's an assumption you see everywhere in extension systems, and it restricts everything to "features or security, but not both".

            Taking your examples:

            > run a locally installed linter

            VSCode and its extensions have certain files opened. The linter can do much less if it gets read-only access to those files, but not write access and no other files, not the open internet or something.

            This has then to be coupled with those permissions being displayed before installing, allowing them to be reviewed by users as well as plugin repo curators. Basically listing those permissions as declarative metadata.

            Because then a user or curator won't see "this plugin can read and write all your files" but "this plugin can read (but not write) the files being opened by VSCode". If the plugin wants to exfiltrate those files, the permissions would also list "this plugin can send HTTP requests to totally-legit-site.ru" instead of "this plugin gets arbitrary internet access".

            Main lession: permissions are WAY too coarse. But if they are fine-grained, they will soon no longer match the evolution of extensions, so the core system has to evolve too.

            > view the status of docker containers

            "This plugin can view the status of all docker containers started by other VSCode extensions in the same VSCode window".

            > users will scream and cry about extensions being limited

            Are those the same users? We might need two different products here, "feature VSCode" and "secure VSCode".

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            • vlovich123 6小时前
              I don’t know what linters you use, but the ones I like are the ones that show you problems in the workspace stably, not just in the files that happen to be open and altering as files open and close.

              You can always improve, but pretending like there’s an easy solution is lazy - if it was easy it would have been done.

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              • moring 5小时前
                This was bad wording on my part. I wrote "open" but that should have been "files in the workspace/project". Really, "open" WRT files is so overloaded already, they can be in the workspace, have an editor tab open for them, or have an active file handle, to name just three.
            • Gigachad 5小时前
              These kinds of permissions lists have been mostly a failure in history. Users see a massive list of permissions, or permissions constantly changing between updates and just ignore them because there’s no way to reasonably audit them or take any action on them.

              Securing VS code would require making malware that has access to the system impossible, not just making it add a permission to the permission list.

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              • moring 5小时前
                Ideally, the permission list is meant for curators which end-users trust and can rely on.

                Also, historically, permission lists have been fine-grained but too coarse at the same time, meaning they were "fine" in the wrong way, based on what is easy to implement instead of what the user needs.

      • yard2010 5小时前
        The shit show that's called lastpass, which I unfortunately know, was hacked because a developer installed a bad version of Plex Media Server on his work computer.
    • wyclif 5小时前
      I don't use VSCode, but doesn't their plugin ecosystem indicate if the plugin is MSFT-approved?
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    • cwnyth 10小时前
      I've stayed with Sublime, often to the derision of VSCode addicts. I love to see the "VSCode is perfect" uncritical thinkers get theirs.
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    • at-fates-hands 11小时前
      I've become equally paranoid about VSCode extensions. I remember using several other IDE's like Brackets, JetBrains, Sublime Text or Bluefish only having a few solid extensions to rely on to get my dev work done. Now it seems like anything you do, someone or some company has built an extension specifically for your task.

      At this point I try and get the most done with the least amount of extensions period. That and trying to get the rest of my code off of Github is the other.

    • ToucanLoucan 12小时前
      About the level of security in software I expect from the vendor who came up with “screenshotting your desktop every few seconds, OCRing those, and dumping the results to disk unencrypted in plain text”
    • xgulfie 10小时前
      And they all want to auto-update, too.
  • notnullorvoid 15小时前
    I really hope this pushes Microsoft to add a explicit permission system to VS Code extensions, and improve security of dev containers.
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    • pamcake 13小时前
      I really hope this pushes users (here: devs and maintainers) to decrease their reliance on Microsoft and especially stop outsourcing security to them.

      Migrate off vscode already.

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      • hungryhobbit 13小时前
        I won't say "you can take my VS Code from cold dead hands" or anything, but it is a very good tool, and Microsoft hasn't yet fucked it up the way they have so many other things.

        I guess I'd say "you take my VS Code ... willingly ... but only after M$ fucks it up and makes me not want it anymore (like they've done to everything else they acquired)".

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        • overfeed 11小时前
          > Microsoft hasn't yet fucked it up the way they have so many other things.

          Not for lack of trying, the amount of CoPilot cruft bundled with the core IDE is growing quarterly.

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          • dd8601fn 10小时前
            Seriously. I think I saw they just added another “please use the agent chats here!” button.

            Every updates release notes is like 90% “now with more copilot plz use it.”

        • loloquwowndueo 12小时前
          Vs code is a weapon, designed to fracture. It being “good” is a weapon as well. https://ghuntley.com/fracture/
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          • kristiandupont 6小时前
            That seems like a very, very long-winded way of accusing them of "embrace, extend, extinguish"? Which is obviously not falsifiable, but just feels a bit trite at this point, IMO.
        • iririririr 11小时前
          Did you try intellij ever?

          And are you a vscode original? or came from vim/emacs?

        • sieabahlpark 12小时前
          [dead]
      • Gigachad 12小时前
        The problem is not VS code itself. It's the fact extensions can access things outside of the editor. As far as I am aware, no editor sandboxes extensions.
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        • stephenr 11小时前
          Part of the problem is that people are adding a metric fuck ton of extensions onto a text editor trying to make it into an IDE.

          If you start with an IDE first you likely need far fewer extensions.

      • notnullorvoid 13小时前
        > Migrate off vscode already.

        Zed is the closest thing I've found to meet my needs, and I do plan to try it. However it's dev container support looks to be lacking in some important ways so we'll see.

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        • -iad 7小时前
          Let me save you some hassle. I test drove Zed for a week after the v1.0 release. My projects deal exclusively in dev containers. I spent more time troubleshooting issues than actually working. Things which VS Code handles transparently, like installing the support libraries to run a chrome debug session, say. Your local SSH agent isn’t forwarded into the container, so git push doesn’t work natively. That’s after you’ve had to add your project as a safe directory in your container’s git config, because it isn’t mapped to your local git config. Things which I was disappointed and surprised were not addressed prior to v1.
        • TiredOfLife 8小时前
          Zed is even worse about arbitrarily downloading random stuff from random websites and executing it
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      • ajross 13小时前
        > Migrate off vscode already.

        It's not the IDE, though. Any extensible, customizable display editor can be coerced into behaving badly by installing external code. Even this one: https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/emacs-paper.html

        The root(-ish) cause here is the ease of publishing and installing extension code, and in particular the fact that there's no independent validation/verification step between the upstream author and armageddon. And upstream authors aren't set up with the needed precautions themselves, they're just hackers.

        Basically if you phish Just One Account with write access to an extension you wan pwn everyone who's running it.

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        • skydhash 6小时前
          > Any extensible, customizable display editor can be coerced into behaving badly by installing external code.

          But I think only VS Code (And Jetbrain's ones) is so pushy about installing extensions. With Emacs, you actually have to go find them and install it. And then you actually have to make a conscious effort to update them. Same with vim. I'm pretty sure VS Code enable auto updates. And I would guess the people publishing Emacs's package and Vim's plugin are way more conscious about security.

      • spudlyo 12小时前
        Emacs has been a viable option for going on a half century now. The GNU Emacs 31 branch[0] was cut recently and is barreling towards a new release. It might be time to give it another look.

        I'm not saying its package ecosystem isn't vulnerable to these kind of attacks, it is, but it's at least developed by folks with very different goals and ambitions than Microsoft.

        [0]: https://github.com/emacs-mirror/emacs/blob/master/etc/NEWS

    • fg137 15小时前
      Not holding my breath. This issue has been open since 2018 https://github.com/microsoft/vscode/issues/52116
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      • notnullorvoid 14小时前
        Yeah, the only thing that gives me hope is the optics of this happening to GitHub. Though it seems possible VS Code team could double down on the opinion that this isn't a permission/sandboxing problem, and is instead a scanning/threat detection problem.
  • dang 16小时前
    Previous thread in sequence:

    GitHub is investigating unauthorized access to their internal repositories - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48201316 - May 2026 (321 comments)

  • urbandw311er 14小时前
    I wonder if this was the compromised nx console extension that bit me yesterday. The timing seems identical. See https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-...
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  • codedokode 16小时前
    Note that VS Code is built on Electron and it is a pain to sandbox because Electron has (had?) SUID sandbox helper, and you cannot run SUID binaries in sandbox easily. Sandboxing on Linux is extremely difficult task.
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    • jandrese 16小时前
      It feels so bad to see the "You need go give Chrome SUID Root for the sandbox to work". Setting a Web Browser SUID Root was an old joke about clueless users. It was the worst security screwup someone could imagine.
    • NewJazz 14小时前
      Don't build your ide on electron then.
    • duped 15小时前
      podman seems to handle rootless namespaces just fine, minor caveat for some perf overhead but it's not the end of the world.
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      • internet101010 15小时前
        And volumes. Volumes are not fun with podman. Ironically my team tried GitHub Codespaces and never looked back. Super cheap and uses DevContainers.
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        • unethical_ban 13小时前
          What's the difference between Podman and docker for volumes? Other than needing to add Z to get volumes to mount with SELinux
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          • miki123211 11小时前
            If you're root on a system and use Docker volumes, you can always `sudo ls` and access those volumes outside of the container.

            If you're just a user running containers under Podman, it's more tricky.

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          • NewJazz 11小时前
            Maybe permissions when going rootlesz?
  • tekacs 16小时前
    Maybe I'm missing something really obvious, but... 3,800 repos? I guess I find it kind of surprising they have that many!
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    • PAndreew 15小时前
      As others have said it's just a fraction. I'm in a medium size tech-related company and we have 7500+ in one Github org. We have two orgs, so altogether easily 10K+. Of course most of it is stale, obsolete, sandbox, personal tools, etc. I wouldn't be surprised if Github would have 100K+ internal repos or even more.
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      • htrp 14小时前
        no pruning of repos?
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        • sbarre 14小时前
          No OP but I used to work at a large company with a similar number of repos.

          When I left about a year ago, we had just started (after being on Github for almost 8 years) an ongoing project of first archiving old/outdated repos in place, and then moving them to an "archived" sub-org, and waiting to see if anyone complained.

          Previously no one wanted to outright delete or remove repos because of the risk that someone somewhere was relying on it, and also there was no actual downside to just leaving them there (no cost savings, no imminent danger other than clutter, etc), so resources were never allocated to do it. There was always something more important to work on.

          In an org with a higher floor of engineering management, a proactive program for removing unused or outdated repos would absolutely be expected though I think.

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          • a_t48 13小时前
            This is a continual fight for me. At nearly every company I've had to compromise on using a graveyard repo for packages within a monorepo, even though git has the whole history already.
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            • Sander_Marechal 5小时前
              The problem with history is that you need to know when to look. If you're looking for some old code that you know existed but you don't know exactly what it was, you can't just browse to go and find it.
        • NewJazz 14小时前
          Gitlab is so nice for this. You can group repos together so it is harder to lose track of stale projects.
        • fn-mote 13小时前
          Breaks old stuff
    • philipp-gayret 15小时前
      I worked for a food retail store once. I remember going in the first day wondering, how hard can it really be... From the outside, it looks like they have a simple website. The website to order things on was an amalgamation of 300+ repo's. GitHub lost less in this breach. It takes a lot of effort to keep things simple as you grow.
      [-]
      • robotnikman 13小时前
        Can confirm as someone working in the same field, we have a ton of repos
    • ashishb 15小时前
      Uber had 8000 repos at one point with 2000 engineers - https://highscalability.com/lessons-learned-from-scaling-ube...
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      • Gigachad 12小时前
        Probably most of them are forks of some public repo with some patch applied and half of those are probably not even used internally anymore.
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        • ashishb 10小时前
          Afaik, they eventually cleaned it up.

          And it was each team owning multiple internal repos of their own deployments/libraries, and not, primarily, clones of public repos.

    • ryanhecht 13小时前
      Something cool that I've always liked about working at GitHub is how much of the company _runs on GitHub_ -- A lot of teams, even non-technical teams, have their own repos just to organize docs/SOP's/designs/etc like a traditional knowledge work company might use a Sharepoint
    • tempay 15小时前
      Personally I have over a hundred, especially from quick prototypes, studies or instances of templates so I can easily see how over 18 years and many hundreds of employees you end up with thousands.
    • jamesfinlayson 10小时前
      I remember working at a company with at least 5,000 repos across five or six GitHub orgs, plus more stuff in Perforce.

      Probably some old experiments in there but the company had its fingers in a few pies and some departments didn't mind creating yet another service to solve a problem.

      I definitely archived the old stuff in my department (we had eight repos and that felt like enough for three people).

    • MrDarcy 15小时前
      3800 is low for an org like GitHub. Glad it’s highly likely not all their repos are compromised.
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      • organsnyder 15小时前
        Given the attack vector, it's possible that the impacted repos were ones that see more activity.
    • wazHFsRy 6小时前
      Even their sales teams work with GitHub repos, so not that surprising I’d say.
    • dgellow 15小时前
      I was part of an org with more than 15k repos
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      • clutch_coder99 6小时前
        Damn that's alot. I'm wondering how many engineers handled all that?
    • skissane 15小时前
      In my personal experience, give it a decade or two, and any corporation will accumulate hundreds (or even thousands) of abandoned internal repos containing discontinued services, POCs/prototypes that never went anywhere, etc – people forget to archive them, or aren't sure whether something is still in use or not so err on the safe side.

      AI is making this even worse. With coding agents, anyone can throw together a quick internal prototype of any idea they have, even if it has no hope of ever making it to production.

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      • unix4ever 14小时前
        Maybe though AI will make it better, assign agents to monitor, maintain and keep repos up to date or via A2A refer them to an agent to dispose of them in accordance with company requirements. I actually think AI will greatly help this type of problem.
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        • skissane 13小时前
          Autoarchiving repos which nobody has used in X years doesn’t require any AI - you can just write a bot to do it. People don’t, because it isn’t a priority. AI can make writing such a bot a bit easier, but can’t help much with getting approval from the powers that be to run it.
    • newsoftheday 15小时前
      It sounds low to me, I worked at a Fortune high number a few years ago and they had more.
    • eddythompson80 15小时前
      really? I mean these are internal repos. Probably most of them are random one-off experiments or a place to park code. Google has 2,900 "public" repos on github. Microsoft has ~8k "public" on github too. Can't even imagine how many they have on their internal systems.
    • noelsusman 15小时前
      Am I missing the joke here... they have hundreds of millions of repos.
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      • dijit 15小时前
        I think they mean that these are internal github-org repos.

        The ones used for running the site itself.

        Though, its so many that i think there are some customer ones in there too.

      • nightpool 15小时前
        No, there's no joke, you might have just misread the article (the 3,800 number is the number of internal GitHub repos the employee had downloaded on their personal computer / had access to on their own GitHub account)
      • Galanwe 15小时前
        The breach is about internal repositories, not user repositories.
    • paulddraper 15小时前
      They have 800 engineers. So 3,800 repos is high, but not crazy.

      Some of those could be forks.

  • delduca 8小时前
    Zed extensions are sandboxeds with restricted permissions btw…
  • QuantumNoodle 13小时前
    I'm more surprised hackers found a large enough uptime window to do this.
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    • hungryhobbit 13小时前
      For those not getting the joke, GitHub has had an increasingly difficult keeping itself up since Microsoft acquired them.

      It's gotten a lot worse (and made news) more recently, as the downtime as increased.

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      • miki123211 11小时前
        *since coding agents caused their commit rate to increase 14x.
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        • platevoltage 10小时前
          A problem that they contributed to.
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          • nicce 5小时前
            Maybe they actually try to increase the uptime now by making Copilot plans worse.
      • QuantumNoodle 12小时前
        Giggity.
      • pathartl 13小时前
        No, it's had an increasingly difficult time keeping itself ever since they fixed their uptime metric collection, added Actions, and exploded in users.
    • gjtorikian 8小时前
      Copying a joke posted somewhere else? Wow https://x.com/anshuc/status/2056898035159056558
      [-]
      • fragmede 8小时前
        Thinking a GitHub uptime joke is so creative only one person could have thought of it? Wow.
  • cdrnsf 14小时前
    That's one way to make things open source.
    [-]
    • dlcarrier 10小时前
      If you ever want to whistle blow or otherwise leak private information, this would be a great way to do it. Don't just blatantly run the script on your user account, but anonymously upload it as a plug-in that does the scraping and something useless, like tells you which floating-point numbers are even (none of them) then run that and play the victim.
  • freakynit 6小时前
    Updated: Catalog of all major npm/nodejs ecosystem attacks since May 2025-2026: https://npm-supply-chain-attacks-25-26.pagey.site/

    All used techniques and mitigation strategies, including this one: https://npm-supply-chain-attack-techniques.pagey.site/

  • 1970-01-01 16小时前
    But, it did not go down! Progress!
    [-]
    • marcosdumay 15小时前
      It's working, we just don't know what it's doing.
      [-]
      • baq 14小时前
        GitHub confirmed skynet
    • LkpPo 14小时前
      No time to deploy, nobody must move a muscle during the forensic investigation!
    • skullone 15小时前
      Don't jinx it!
  • fg137 15小时前
    The (lack of) security of VSCode has always been astounding. People have asked for sandboxing extensions for years [0] with little to no progress, and issues have been discussed a lot (e.g. [1][2]). I guess it hasn't been a big issue, likely because most developers are not complete idiots. But it only takes one developer and one bad extension to consequences like this.

    I mean, I understand that it is hard to sandbox Node.js applications, but apparently Microsoft has put way more effort into their Copilot slop than security.

    [0] https://github.com/microsoft/vscode/issues/52116

    [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42979994

    [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46855527

    [-]
    • Atotalnoob 11小时前
      You don’t have to be an idiot to be hacked. A legit extension can be sold or compromised due to no fault of the engineer

      Don’t attack individuals for mistakes of a system.

    • bbor 13小时前
      I am so, so stressed about Sublime Text... It feels like a massive disaster just waiting to happen. They don't even run their own package marketplace :(
      [-]
      • tstrimple 10小时前
        There are so few users of sublime text that it likely isn’t a juicy enough target for these sorts of exploits.
    • zx8080 14小时前
      > but apparently Microsoft has put way more effort into their Copilot slop than security.

      Your security or their money (selling Copilot to enterprise customers): what would they choose, hmm? Surprise!

    • ozim 14小时前
      Why would you sandbox extension?

      Just don’t install crap maybe.

      [-]
      • Hackbraten 13小时前
        Any good, benign extension can be taken over and weaponized with malware.
      • pixl97 13小时前
        This mans security onion has one layer.
      • Gigachad 12小时前
        Even if you don't install crap, the latest strategy is attacking the developer of one of the extensions or their build process so you can push a malware update to an otherwise legitimate extension.
      • fhn 11小时前
        thanks for the sage advice. Next time you are infected with the flu you should just don't breath maybe.
  • schpet 14小时前
    i'd love to be able to use fine grained tokens with gh and not expose every repo and org that i am connected to on github, but you can't see the results of a github actions check that way (no 'Checks' permission available). hoping these breaches push things in the direction of access being less annoying to manage.
    [-]
    • alexfoo 14小时前
      The problem is that the main target for these repos are the internal IaaS type repos that contain much of the juicy information.

      A fine grained token is likely to have read access to the IaaS repo as that is likely the very repo they are operating on when the malware compromises them.

      3800 repos up for blackmail may make a good headline but it's likely that Github don't really care about 3798 of those repos being made public. It'd be annoying for those 3798 to be made public but they can deal with that. It's the 2 repos that contain really important stuff that they really don't want to be made public. You can't rely on fine grained tokens to limit the leak of these things as, at some point, someone with that very access will get compromised.

      Limiting TTL on tokens/auth isn't a perfect solution either. If the token is leaked via some malware it can be used to clone repos within minutes (even seconds) of being leaked. No-one wants to have to perform 2FA every few seconds in order to get on with their day.

      IP based restrictions may help, but then the malware would probably evolve to include a tailscale/wireguard key so that the clone/exfiltration is done from the existing IP address and then the data is proxied away separately.

      Future dev environments are going to be heavily sandboxed in terms of "do github stuff in this sandbox, copy files to another sandbox to do package updates, vet everything coming back, etc"

      [-]
      • schpet 12小时前
        i was more thinking like, if i am working on project ABC for org XYZ it's understandable that if my dev vm gets owned that ABC is leaked. it's not that acceptable if all of org XYZ's repos that i have access to get leaked. and especially not acceptable if everything i have access to, including other orgs, and the admin ability to do destructive operations on them, gets exposed. but status quo is that that's absolutely the case, and you basically need org specific github accounts to reduce the risk of that. or use the knee-capped fine grained PATs that github offers but don't work for common things like seeing if your PR is green.

        agree generally with what your getting at though: doesn't solve this problem. but even just a basic reduction in blast radius would be nice.

    • spockz 14小时前
      I was noodling around with personal access tokens today on GitHub and found out that you actually can restrict tokens to specific repositories, orgs, etc. Not sure if actions is a scope that is available or not.
  • pamcake 13小时前
    At what point did/does it start feeling naive to trust the integrity and output of Github Actions on general? Does it feel unlikely that an attacker would be able to get a foothold in that infrastructure?
  • psadauskas 14小时前
    If only the company behind VSCode, the company behind NPM and the company behind GitHub could get together and figure out a solution to this.
    [-]
    • lacker 13小时前
      Perfectly demonstrating the truth of the "Microsoft org chart" cartoon.

      https://bonkersworld.net/organizational-charts

      [-]
      • dlcarrier 11小时前
        At first I though the Apple one had a half-dozen departments actually coordinating on something, but then I took a closer look and realized it's just more micromanagement.
        [-]
        • stingraycharles 10小时前
          I think the chart is still from the Steve Jobs era, who definitely was known to be a micromanager.
          [-]
          • bgro 7小时前
            There’s an interview with someone talking about Steve having an extreme melt down rage about the header not being technically centered in one spot on the Apple page.

            I want to see his reaction trying to type a message on the iPhone keyboard from anytime in the past 7 years.

            Or navigate the random nonsensical grouping of stuff in settings that got so out of control they added a search bar or watch a pip video or really use anything. Every feature has some sloppy problem.

            It used to be excusable as nobody else was trying and they’d be working to fix it. Now they just add a feature that’s sub par to things already out there, no innovation, and then it feels sloppy. Most things just don’t feel good to use down to the size and weight of phones now. Rather than fix the problem Apple just keeps copying the homework and claiming they can’t fix perfect.

            Steve would be punching holes in the wall. Probably would stomp a hole through the floor to strangle the keyboard team

            [-]
            • wyclif 5小时前
              And that's just the iPhone keyboard. The physical keyboards on MacBookPros are still terrible. I've had two of them where some of the keys shorted out or stopped working. Eventually, thinness has diminishing returns. I'd rather have a thicker/heavier keyboard where the keys don't die.
          • cm11 7小时前
            My thought on this was always that micromanaging in this structure is rational and maybe even the best. It's not really a Jobs thing—though he's (right or wrong) probably the picture most people have in their head when they think of visionary CEO—it's just that if the leader has a vision then it is great if they're capable of having everything run through them. It's when there's no vision at the top and no leaders sitting across the silos pulling things together that it helps the company to have people below with increasing autonomy. Whether the autonomous people should be higher or lower depends on which other org structure you've chosen. Silos are fine when leaders have a vision. That said, I haven't seen many groups that placed power in the place where their chosen org structure is meant to place power.
      • 0xpgm 9小时前
        This is 2011 though, a lot has changed since then. I doubt Facebook/Meta, for instance, is still as flat as it was then having read some ex-employee accounts
      • BowBun 11小时前
        I've seen this a million times, but aren't the Amazon and Apple ones kinda the same, just differently shaped?
        [-]
        • danielheath 11小时前
          One has 1:2 fanout, the other has 1:50 fanout.
        • matkoniecz 9小时前
          Also, Apple has master micromanager overriding managers.
    • guiambros 10小时前
      Well, it certainly wasn't for lack of warning about the glaring risks...

      https://github.com/microsoft/vscode/issues/52116

      [-]
      • dmix 9小时前
        That is a very well written proposal, I wish someone wrote that sort of ticket for my software projects
    • ozim 14小时前
      It is also company behind NuGet.

      Guess what they did a year ago.

      They removed 700 or so packages from NuGet proactively but those turned out to be false positives.

      It is hard to do the right things.

      [-]
      • stogot 11小时前
        It is hard for Microsoft to do the right things*

        FTFY

        [-]
        • hedora 10小时前
          In fairness, there was a time when I was unable to have a computer sort search results so the default hit was the plugin with 1000x more downloads than all the others combined.
    • getpokedagain 11小时前
      Not trolling here but these things are by design cesspools ready for compromise. Any fully open ecosystem where contributions are not strictly reviewed is open to this problem. If you don't like it, don't use editor extensions and use a well audited editor.

      If you want to use extensions or node packages or pypi packages without doing a detailed review you're accumulating technical debt. You're assuming a risk in order to ship rapidly. You can either pay that down at some point under control, or bear the interest when it comes due.

      [-]
      • LiamPowell 11小时前
        Extensions never had to be given unsandboxed access to everything. That's a choice that they actively made.
        [-]
        • getpokedagain 9小时前
          I mean I don't think some sort of "access control" within the editor is going to really address this. People edit sensitive text in their code editor and no matter what that is going to be available to most useful extensions. Even if you don't lose a credential or get some arbitrary script running to mine crypto on your machine you could have an extension function as a key logger and exfil code you really think is valuable.
          [-]
          • Gigachad 9小时前
            It would have restrained the access here. The extension would have only had access to the repos opened by this individual rather than an api key that gave access to 3,800 repos.

            They probably should have some permission system where the default extension is only able to operate within the repos open at the time and has no internet access. Then you can grant internet access for the ones which genuinely need it.

            The majority of VS code plugins are just syntax highlighers and linters which don't need any dangerous permissions.

          • stanac 8小时前
            Most of these problems could be solved with something like wasm/wasi where you can limit access to web, disk, etc... WASI is made to run code you don't trust, you could even limit compute third party is using so they can't mine crypto (I think it's called fuel limit). Ideally we would have whole IDE run in this kind of environment where we can explicitly say what it can and can't do.
        • wutwutwat 10小时前
          its easy to complain, words are cheap. fork it and change it if you don't like it
          [-]
          • antiframe 10小时前
            It's easy to wave a magic wand and have one developer do better than a corporation of tens of thousands. There is a reason I don't use Microsoft products: I can't do it myself and do won't do it for me.
            [-]
            • lkjdsklf 7小时前
              There is no editor that sandboxes extensions as described.

              Emacs, vim/nvim, intellij, etc… pretty much all vulnerable to such an attack

              Reality is most devs wouldn’t be satisfied with the limitations proper sandboxing would create.

          • jurgenburgen 10小时前
            Then you lose access to the VSCode marketplace which kind of defeats the purpose.
    • sieabahlpark 12小时前
      [dead]
    • notnmeyer 14小时前
      i mean, then you say it like that…
      [-]
      • midtake 14小时前
        Microsoft is the inverse hand of Midas, turns everything into shit.
        [-]
        • dbalatero 14小时前
          Mierdas, as they say.
        • pixl97 13小时前
          With $101 billion in profit last year I wish I could turn things into $hit as well as they do.
          [-]
          • andrei_says_ 11小时前
            You could, with a large enough captive audience.
            [-]
            • jrgd 9小时前
              or a large enough hand
        • loloquwowndueo 12小时前
          Everything Microsoft makes sucks. If they decided to make vacuum cleaners though, they wouldn’t suck, they would blow.
          [-]
          • lysace 11小时前
            Just five years ago this opinion was heresy on HN. Those of us who still remembered their behavior in the 80s/90s were belittled.

            "They have changed, gramps. This really smart Satya Nadella is CEO. They are the good guys now. Don't be so bitter over old stuff like systematic use of illegal tactics to attempt to kill all of its competitors including Linux."

            Also: Note that the headline undersells the news dramatically. The article begins with:

            "GitHub has confirmed that roughly 3,800 internal repositories were breached after one of its employees installed a malicious VS Code extension."

            [-]
            • cwnyth 10小时前
              Pretty sure that was astroturfing.
              [-]
              • lysace 10小时前
                I always wondered what the division of pro-MS astroturfing was betweeen:

                a) Waggener Edstrom (now: WE Communications) or similar

                b) Microsoft employees

                c) Third-party Microsoft-only developers/IT people (with an obvious vested financial interest)

        • bhadass 13小时前
          these days it's just Microslop
  • bfivyvysj 11小时前
    Why is the extension not being named?
    [-]
  • dotwaffle 12小时前
    I'd have thought that by now, most would have been swapping to WebAssembly. It's really nicely sandboxed, you expose it to only what you want, and you can compile a lot of languages into a WASM form meaning you're not stuck with only Javascript or similar. Am I naive for thinking that?
  • prodigycorp 8小时前
    Someone scold me if I'm wrong but this is really worrying. Threat actors with Github's internal code means a huge acceleration in vulnerability discovery for the one platform where everybody warehouses their code.

    How is this not really, really bad?

    [-]
    • drewda 6小时前
      This will not reassure you, but the reason it isn't necessarily really bad is because it's only incrementally worse than the really bad news came out last month:

      Security researchers identified a series of exploitable vulnerabilities in github.com by using LLMs to review the compiled GitHub Enterprise Server binaries: https://www.wiz.io/blog/github-rce-vulnerability-cve-2026-38...

    • ViAchKoN 8小时前
      It is really bad. But I think other Git providers also have weaknesses. Maybe it is just not a public knowledge or exploited.
    • itake 8小时前
      [dead]
  • nullbio 9小时前
    This is why uninstalled 90% of my VSCode extensions last year. The writing is/was on the wall.
  • eneveu 11小时前
    When installing IntelliJ IDEA extensions, I download the code and try to check it for malicious stuff using Claude Code... But not perfect since the code might not match what was released. We would need reproducible builds...

    I was also toying with comparimg timestamps of git tags / GitHub releases / GitHub actions / plugin update timestamps as one indicator of potential tempering.

    But not ideal.

    [-]
    • BoneShard 10小时前
      If you don't do it for every update, then there is no real point in doing that in the first place.
  • innoying 16小时前
    If you own a GitHub organization and are looking for what changes/controls you can apply to reduce the risk/impact of PAT token exfiltration (and subsequent abuse) like what occurred here, I listed a few at the end of https://blog.bored.engineer/github-canarytokens-5c9e36ad7ecf...

    - Enable audit log streaming[1] on your enterprise including source IPs and API requests, even if it’s just going to an S3 bucket nobody looks at it, your incident response team will thank you later.

    - Enforce the use of SSO on your GitHub organization[2], not just because SSO is good but because it forces an explicit authorization action[3] by users to grant an SSH key/PAT access to your organization resources, instead of granting access implicitly. That way the PAT created for someone’s weekend project won’t have access to your organization resources.

    - Enforce an IP allowlist[4] for your organization from a set of known trusted VPN/corporate IPs. This is by-far the strongest control (and the most painful to rollout) as it will prevent stolen credentials (even if still valid) from being used by an attacker except on the intended systems where you (hopefully) have other visibility/alerting via EDR or related tooling.

    - If you can, restrict access from personal access tokens[5] to your organization resources. Blocking classic PATs and enforcing a maximum expiration (ex: 3 months) on fine-grained PATs is a great way to reduce risk if you can’t eliminate PATs altogether[6].

    - If you use GitHub enterprise (on-prem), configure collection of the raw HTTP access logs[7] in addition to native GitHub audit logs, it may prove critical during incident response.

    [1]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/mon... [2]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/authentic... [3]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/authentic... [4]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizat... [5]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizat... [6]: https://edu.chainguard.dev/open-source/octo-sts/overview/ [7]: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.16/admin/moni...

  • lxxpxlxxxx 6小时前
    Is there any way to know if my repos were affected?
    [-]
    • Bairfhionn 6小时前
      If you work for Github you are likely affected.
  • vldszn 15小时前
    friendly reminder:

    - disable auto-updates for extensions in VS Code/Cursor

    - use static analysis for GitHub Actions to catch security issues in pre-commit hook and on ci: https://github.com/zizmorcore/zizmor

    - set locally: pnpm config set minimum-release-age 4320 # 3 days in minutes https://pnpm.io/supply-chain-security

    - for other package managers check: https://gist.github.com/mcollina/b294a6c39ee700d24073c0e5a4e...

    - add Socket Free Firewall when installing npm packages on CI to catch malware https://docs.socket.dev/docs/socket-firewall-free#github-act...

    [-]
    • no-name-here 7小时前
      Thanks!

      > for other package managers

      For other js package managers. Sadly such functionality seems far less common for c# (nuget) or rust (cargo).

      > add Socket Free Firewall when installing npm packages on CI to catch malware

      It appears that functionality depends on blacklisting malware from being downloaded? But don't the repositories (npm, etc) take down malware once it's identified - is socket actually blacklisting malware faster than npm? That sounds unlikely, but maybe? For the vs code extension from the op post, it seems like it was live for like 18 minutes on the official vs code marketplace, and slightly longer on openvsx as ms sadly doesn't allow vs code clones to use the official marketplace.

    • mikeweiss 8小时前
      Or how about just don't allow your VS extensions outbound Internet access ...
      [-]
      • no-name-here 7小时前
        How? I haven’t found a way to do that on windows, as even with third-party monitoring firewalls, extension's network access is indistinguishable from the rest of VS code, so you’d either have to disallow network access from both VS code and all of its extensions combined, or none of them?
    • arandomhuman 13小时前
      friendly reminder: use vim :)
      [-]
      • IcyWindows 12小时前
        If you are a person that installs extensions from public sources, it doesn't matter what IDE you use.

        If you don't (or can't) install extensions, it also doesn't matter which IDE you use.

        [-]
        • archargelod 7小时前
          You can and should and I do glance at a diff of changes every time you update a vim plugin. To make this feasible - I only use a handful of plugins I *really need*.
      • leni536 13小时前
        It honestly surprises me we don't hear news about vim/neovim plugin supply chain attacks.
        [-]
        • arandomhuman 12小时前
          probably a much smaller dependency graph (lesser usage of transitive dependencies)
      • vldszn 13小时前
        =)
  • zx8080 10小时前
    > "Yesterday we detected and contained a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned VS Code extension. We removed the malicious extension version, isolated the endpoint, and began incident response immediately,"

    So great that they removed the extension! Do they do it only after their own employee was infected? And why "unnamed" extension?

    [-]
  • huey77 12小时前
    The forum listing for the stolen source code (per the screenshot in article) says 1 buyer or they leak for free. Is GitHub about to become open source?
  • monster_truck 9小时前
    Where's the torrent
  • neya 11小时前
    This has significant consequences for companies hosting their private repos with GitHub. It's a huge security threat if the attacked has access to the source code. At the very least, GitHub should let people know if their repo was part of the hack or not. It's the most responsible thing to do.
    [-]
    • nerdix 11小时前
      Well, the hacker group claims to have access to the Github source code according to the linked article. And apparently, one lucky buyer with at least $50,000 can also have access.
  • purpleidea 13小时前
    What's inside the canada.tar.gz one?
  • gus_ 1天前
    so how did they exfiltrate the information without noticing? what OS was the developer using? what security measures were they using?

    yesterday discussion https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48191680

    [-]
    • amluto 16小时前
      The security measure that the developer didn't use was completely refusing to use vscode.

      vscode has no security model. It's not like swiss cheese where there are holes and some of the go all the way through. vscode is all hole with some cheese on the side. There is absolutely no isolation between the front-end process, the backend size (the thing that runs in the remote or the devcontainer), and any extensions or anything that might be in a repository whose authors you "trust".

      [-]
      • applfanboysbgon 15小时前
        Or you can just refuse to use random extensions. I built my own extensions if I needed them. You're a programmer, right? The whole point of extensibility is that you, or your company, can program what you need from your IDE, without having to make a whole IDE from scratch. I have since moved on to making my own IDE, mostly because I hate Electron and its >1gb memory footprint, but vscode served me so much better than anything else for years, without installing a single rando's extension.
        [-]
        • amluto 13小时前
          Kind of.

          A vscode workspace can trivially execute code on the machine that runs the server end of vscode. (This is how building works -- there is no sandbox unless the workspace config explicitly uses some kind of sandbox.) So the workspace can usually trivially elevate permissions to take over the vscode server, including installing extensions on it without asking you.

          In principle, there is a teeny tiny bit of isolation between the local and remote sides, so the remote side cannot trivially execute code on the local machine. But I recommend reading this rather long-standing ticket:

          https://github.com/microsoft/vscode-remote-release/issues/66...

          [-]
          • cozzyd 13小时前
            It would be nice if there was an easy way to prevent people from installing vscode remotes on a shared server... Probably can run an ebpf routine to disallow creation of folders named . vscode*
            [-]
            • amluto 12小时前
              The shared part has almost nothing to do with this, IMO.
        • dylan604 14小时前
          > You're a programmer, right?

          This is my position as well, but it's rarely received well. Usually, a response like "why would I rewrite something that's already been written and available?" By writing the code, I know how it works. I know it is not infected with crap. I know it will not in the future be infected with crap from a down stream dependency. It seems to me this really took off with node to the point that it's laughable at what people will include with no thought at all. I know component libraries have existed for many other languages before, but node just stands out to me

          [-]
          • lovich 13小时前
            Most bosses look poorly upon spending their budget on rewriting software that already exists and simultaneously most bosses(although not the exact same set) don’t care about security until a disaster has already occurred.

            And it’s also not like you’re going to literally write every piece of software you use, unless you’ve started all the way down at machine code you’re drawing the line somewhere on using code written by other people.

        • xienze 14小时前
          > I built my own extensions if I needed them. You're a programmer, right? The whole point of extensibility is that you, or your company, can program what you need from your IDE,

          Dude, get real. We don't all have the luxury of being able to engage in endless IDE extension programming side quests just to do our day jobs. And even if we did, there's the reality that whatever you produce is probably not nearly as feature complete or bug free as the extension someone spent years writing. Hence why people want to reach for off the shelf solutions.

          [-]
          • applfanboysbgon 14小时前
            > just to do our day jobs.

            Ah, there it is. The root of most problems in the software industry: people who hate programming and avoid doing it as much as possible, because they only got into it for the money.

            I have no problem writing extensions in my spare time because programming is fun. Because I know how to program, like, actually program and not just copypaste stuff off StackOverflow, it doesn't take years to write a vscode extension, either.

            [-]
            • xienze 13小时前
              > people who hate programming and avoid doing it as much as possible, because they only got into it for the money.

              Yeah, not the case at all. I love programming, I've been doing it since I was a kid, for over 30 years. But I DO have to earn a living, and I'd rather spend free time programming things that interest me. Writing IDE extensions and tooling all the way down to the bare metal because I can't be absolutely sure at all times that node.js code doesn't contain a virus is not one of those things.

            • aee 14小时前
              bait
    • alexfoo 1天前
      The 3800 repos weren't exfiltrated from the compromised machine.

      The malware (be it a VSCode plugin, an npm package, or whatever is next) simply slurps up all of the users private keys/tokens/env-vars it can find and sends this off somewhere covertly.

      It's trivial to do this in a way to avoid detection. The small payload can be encrypted (so it can't be pattern matched) and then the destination can be one of millions of already compromised websites found via a google search and made to look like a small upload (it could even be chunked and uploaded via query parameters in a HTTP GET request).

      The hackers receive the bundle of compromised tokens/keys and go look at what they give access to. Most of the time it's going to be someone's boring home network and a couple of public or private github repos. But every once in a while it's a developer who works at a big organisation (e.g. Github) with access to lots of private repos.

      The hackers can then use the keys to clone all of the internal/private repos for that organisation that the compromised keys have access to. Some organisations may have alerts setup for this, but by the time they fire or are actioned upon the data will probably be downloaded. There's no re-auth or 2FA required for "git clone" in most organisations.

      With this data the hackers have further options:

      a) attempt to extort the company to pay a ransom on the promise of deleting the data

      b) look for more access/keys/etc buried somewhere in the downloaded repos and see what else they can find with those

      c) publish it for shits and giggles

      d) try and make changes to further propagate the malware via similar or new attack vectors

      e) analyse what has been downloaded to work out future attack vectors on the product itself

      Right now Github (and others recently compromised in similar ways) will be thinking about what information is in those internal repos and what damage would it cause if that information became public, or what that information could be used to find out further down the line.

      "Customer data should not be in a github repo" is all well and good, but if the customer data is actually stored in a database somewhere in AWS and there's even just one read-only access token stored somewhere in one private github repo, then there's a chance that the hackers will find that and exfiltrate the customer data that way.

      Preventing the breach is hard. There will always be someone in an org who downloads and installs something on their dev machine that they shouldn't, or uses their dev machine for personal browsing, or playing games, or the company dev infra relies on something that is a known attack vector (like npm).

      Preventing the exfiltration is virtually impossible. If you have a machine with access to the Internet and allow people to use a browser to google things then small payloads of data can be exfiltrated trivially. (I used to work somewhere where the dev network was air-gapped. The only way to get things onto it was typing it in, floppy or QIC-150 tape - in the days before USB memory sticks.)

      Detecting the breach is nigh on impossible if the keys are not used egregiously. Sure some companies can limit access to things like Github to specific IPs, but it wouldn't take much for the malware to do something to work around this. (I can see things like a wireguard/tailscale client being embedded in malware to allow the compromised machine to be used as a proxy in such cases.)

      Alerting that requires manual response is nigh on useless as by the time someone has been paged about something the horse has already bolted.

      Knowing what has been taken is also a huge burden. 3800 repos that people now have to think about and decide what the implications are. Having been through something like this in the past there are plenty of times people go "I know that repo, it's fine, we can ignore that one" only for it to contain something they don't realise could be important.

      These kind of attacks are going to become increasingly common as they're proven to work well and the mitigations for them are HARD. It doesn't need to be targeted at all either, you just infect a bunch of different things and see what gets sent in.

      If companies continue to not pay the ransom then we're going to get a lot more things published and many companies having to apologise for all manner of things that end up being leaked.

      [-]
      • gus_ 1天前
        > It's trivial to do this in a way to avoid detection

        I'd love to see a real example/PoC.

        Anyway, we discussed this issue in the other thread. For me, unrestricted outbound requests to any url, whether it's well known domains like api.github.com or any other domain, are a red flag.

        Why does VS need to establish outbound requests to any domain, without authorization?

        There's no magic solution, and these attacks will evolve, but I still think that restricting outbound requests is a good measure to mitigate these attacks.

        > slurps up all of the users private keys/tokens/env-vars it can find and sends this off somewhere covertly.

        Isolating applications can also mitigate the impact of these attacks. For example, you can restrict VS code to only share with the host .vscode/, .git/ and other directories. Even by project. Again, it's not bulletproof, but helps.

        [-]
        • cloudbonsai 8小时前
          I found more details on how this particular attack worked:

          https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-...

          https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/issues/3148

          So the extension basically rewrites files in `.github/workflows` and pushes them to GitHub, which then sends all the sensitive information to the attacker. It also attempts to plant a malware on the local machine, too.

          My impression is that it would be hard for an OS-level sandbox to completely stop this attack. The sandbox needs to determine whether if a git push originating from an IDE is malicious.

        • array_key_first 17小时前
          > Why does VS need to establish outbound requests to any domain, without authorization?

          I don't know but it's very standard practice in most applications, because telemetry. But VS code is one of the worst: just check open snitch when running VS code, it's constantly phoning to a bunch of IPs.

        • pixl97 23小时前
          > but I still think that restricting outbound requests is a good measure

          It is 100% necessary, but doesn't stop most attacks quick enough.

          If you're posting to github.com/acmecompany then attackers love to do things like add their own user github.com/acemcompany and just upload your data to that. Generally it doesn't last very long, but with CI/CD they can get thousands of keys in a minute and be gone seconds later.

        • mikeweiss 8小时前
          We need to stop normalizing outbound connectivity by default. In fact we should be alerted anytime something tries to go outbound.
        • mmcwilliams 22小时前
          There are plenty of exfiltration examples out there that could go through known, commonly-greenlit domains. Even exfil via DNS requests has been demonstrated.
          [-]
          • antonvs 16小时前
            But at least in that case, there’s a chance that the outbound requests are blocked. Malware isn’t perfect. Simple measures can block a significant proportion of attacks.
        • alexfoo 1天前
          Ah yes, sandboxing/limiting a VSCode plugin is not impossible. I was thinking in more general terms (such as post install scripts within npm/python packages). Random test code in golang packages. There's an awful lot that people don't vet because keeping up with the vetting is a huge burden which seems pointless until you're the one that gets hacked.

          The trick is to infect a plugin that has a legitimate reason for accessing the internet or running certain commands, and then coming up with ways to abuse that to exfiltrate the data. Or exfiltrating via DNS queries, or some other vector that isn't so obvious as "allow TCP/UDP connections to the whole world".

          That or just repeatedly pester a user for permissions until one user (and you only need one within the organisation) relents and grants it.

          [-]
          • gus_ 22小时前
            the pop-ups fatigue is already an issue, and not an easy one to solve. Pretty much like SIEM/SOC alerts.

            > The trick is to infect a plugin that has a legitimate reason for accessing the internet or running certain commands, and then coming up with ways to abuse that to exfiltrate the data. Or exfiltrating via DNS queries, or some other vector that isn't so obvious as "allow TCP/UDP connections to the whole world".

            They'll get there, maybe. But the reality is that right now, everyone allows outbound requests blindly.

            Instead of speculating, I suggest to actually investigate current IOCs and common tactics of malicious npm/pip/plugins/VS extensions. Something like this:

            https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch/discussions/1119

            Or use OpenSnitch (or Lulu, Glasswire, ZoneAlarm anyone?:D etc) to actually analyze real VS malicious extensions or npm packages and see if it stops the exfiltration, and if not, suggest ways to improve it. For example:

            https://markdownpastebin.com/?id=9c294c75f09349d2977a4ccd250...

      • esseph 22小时前
        > If companies continue to not pay the ransom then we're going to get a lot more things published

        Paying the ransom means your data still gets leaked and now you're out of money and embarrassed.

        Why would they ever, ever, delete the data?

        [-]
        • SoftTalker 16小时前
          If paying the ransom doesn't stop your data getting leaked, nobody will pay the ransom. There is a rational basis for the ransomers to follow through with the deletion. Even the mob did provide "protection" when they coerced you into paying for it.
          [-]
          • nativeit 14小时前
            This sounds like a naive presumption. Are ransomware distributors well known for operating within strict hierarchies bound by culturally-ingrained traditions, or acting in the best interests of their own “greater good”?

            Last I heard, teenagers can deploy ransomware with minimal technical knowledge or skill.

          • esseph 14小时前
            [dead]
        • senderista 16小时前
          Because if they leak then nobody will pay the ransom in the future?
          [-]
          • esseph 14小时前
            (responded to a similar response above)
      • kotaKat 1天前
        > The malware (be it a VSCode plugin, an npm package, or whatever is next)

        Not the first time we've seen a developer get popped thanks to a malicious game mod either...

    • dang 16小时前
      (We merged this thread hither - it was originally in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48201316)
  • 2OEH8eoCRo0 16小时前
    So which extension? Why don't they tell us?
    [-]
  • fhn 11小时前
    Good. They are eating their own dog food
  • Onplana 8小时前
    If they tighten up things, it would impact the ease of use.
  • LeoPanthera 14小时前
    Has there been any confirmation of this from a source other than X? It's weird that that's the only source, and therefore makes me distrust the entire story.
    [-]
  • BrunoBernardino 15小时前
    Curious timing that I've started moving private repos to SourceHut a couple of weeks ago. It's pretty good and fast!

    I'm also mirroring public ones to Codeberg.

    I'll write about it when I'm done.

  • kittikitti 10小时前
    If I'm using more than 5 extensions for a lightweight client like VSCode, I consider whether a full IDE is more appropriate since they have the functionality built in. The same features but from 3rd party extensions introduces more attack vectors.
  • aizk 14小时前
    And now, the hackers will be able to scan the repos for more vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities all the way down.
  • CivBase 11小时前
    My company has extremely strict policies about installing software. We have to call up IT any time we want an application installed. As an engineer it's very annoying to deal with, but I understand it. Problem is they have no policy about extensions and npm/pip packages. It's a time bomb waiting to go off.
  • Pxtl 8小时前
    Microsoft: "you shouldn't run untrusted code, here's a mess of ugly dialogs for people to click through if they try."

    Me: "Okay, I'd like to make signed trusted code, how do I do that?"

    Microsoft: "don't worry, we have the most expensive and tedious signing process in the industry."

    Me: "okay, will users be properly protected from malicious code then?"

    Microsoft: "Nope!"

  • josefritzishere 16小时前
    Is it premature to blame AI Microslop?
    [-]
  • sunshine-o 16小时前
    Isn't 50k a bargain for what could potentially be in those files?

    Maybe they looked it up and there wasn't anything interesting but then why take the risk for this kind of money?

    Something doesn't make sense.

    [-]
    • smashed 16小时前
      The data has been stolen by a criminal group. Paying for "restoring" the data does not guarantee they will delete all copies. There is no way of proving they actually did and they have in fact very little incentive to actually delete it.

      You have to take their words for it but how can you trust crooks?

      [-]
      • tyre 15小时前
        > You have to take their words for it but how can you trust crooks?

        Because these are repeat actors. If they take a ransom and then re-sell it, no company will pay them ever again.

        Don't think of experienced criminal enterprises as "groups of irrational scoundrels." They are companies, with employees, who understand game theory.

        [-]
        • dylan604 14小时前
          At some point, these people will come up with a ransom-as-a-service that you can subscribe to make monthly payments. It's no different than having to pay criminals monthly for security to prevent them from harming your themselves.
    • deckar01 15小时前
      > this is not a ransom … Send your offers … we are not interested in under 50k…

      It is a blind auction with a $50k minimum bid.

      [-]
      • sunshine-o 14小时前
        Sure but I meant I do find the minimum bid very low for such a high profile hack.
  • efilife 9小时前
    What was the extension what the fuck? No mention of the name anywher?e
  • jmclnx 16小时前
    Another day another issue with Microsoft products, what else can be said :( At least they are being upfront these days.
  • cnguyen1494 7小时前
    [flagged]
  • vladsiu 7小时前
    [dead]
  • assanineass 14小时前
    [dead]
  • a-dub 16小时前
    [dead]
  • dude250711 14小时前
    A good day not to be using Electronjs trash.
    [-]
    • Gigachad 12小时前
      Electron has nothing to do with the exploit here. A Vim plugin would have just as much ability to run malware.
      [-]
      • skydhash 6小时前
        No one using vim will install the kind of extensions I found on the usual VS Code setup. And most don't even autoupdates.
        [-]
        • Gigachad 5小时前
          I’m not sure this is true. Vim needs extensions even more than VS code since many basic features like full project code search or go to definition aren’t in the base vim.

          And vim has package managers that make installing and updating packages as easy as vs code.

          VS Code like npm are only the targets because they are the most popular, not because they are uniquely vulnerable.

  • thrawa8387336 14小时前
    Who uses GitHub in 2026
  • jehnnysmith 13小时前
    question is why are people still using vscode or coding by hand?
  • sharts 5小时前
    something something javascript, npm, etc.